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Title VII Class Actions: Promises and Pitfalls
VICTORIA J. MEYERS*
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 represented a comprehensive attempt on the part of the federal government to eliminate racial,
religious and sex discrimination in various fields, including housing,
education, voting rights, and public facilities. Its passage by Congress was "an epic legislative struggle," 2 due, in large part, to the
inclusion of Title VII, aimed at prohibiting employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Much
of the controversy surrounding Title VII concerned its enforcement
provisions-not only how it was to be enforced, but who was to
enforce it.4 Since both the federal government and the aggrieved
employee have an interest in ending employment discrimination,
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII. could have been assigned
to either the public or private sector. The version of Title VII which
was originally approved by Congress placed primary responsibility
upon the aggrieved individual to enforce the Act's provisions
through federal court suit. Although the original Act created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) it was not
empowered to bring suit; its authority was limited to investigating
charges of discrimination and seeking informal conciliation.5 The
original Act provided that if this conciliation process was unsuccessful, responsibility for bringing an end to the unlawful practice
* Assistant State Appellate Defender in Chicago, Illinois. B.A., University of Denver, 1970;
J.D., Loyola University of Chicago School of Law, 1974.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (Supp. IV
1974) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Sape & Hart].
2. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431, 445 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vaas]. See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 238].
3. See H.R. REP. 238, supra note 2, at 3.
4. Comment, Title VII and Postjudgment Class Actions, 47 IND. L.J. 350, 351 (1972); see
Vaas, supra note 2. See also Ashton, The Availability of PreliminaryInjunctive Relief to
Private Plaintiffs Pending Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Action Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 51 (1976). Earlier versions of Title VII
provided for the establishment of an EEOC vested with broad enforcement powers. These
powers were eliminated before passage of the legislation and responsibility for enforcement
was vested primarily in the complainant. See Sape & Hart, supra note 1, at 825-30; Comment,
Enforcement of Fair Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. CI. L. REV. 430
(1965).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of 5, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); see Ashton, supra note 4, at 52-53 & n.14.
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shifted to the private individual, who could then bring suit in federal district court.' The enforcement provisions of Title VII were
extensively amended in 1972,1 however, giving the EEOC power to
sue on behalf of an aggrieved individual if its conciliation process
has been unable to effect a successful agreement.' Even under these
amendments the Government does not bear sole responsibility for
bringing suit. The individual retains a limited right of intervention
if the suit is prosecuted by the EEOC and may initiate a suit in
federal district court if: (1) the Commission dismisses the charge he
has filed with it, or (2) 180 days have elapsed since the filing of the
charge with the EEOC without either suit being filed by the EEOC
or a conciliation agreement being effected?
It is, therefore, clear that even as amended much of the responsibility for enforcement of Title VII rests upon the aggrieved employee. 0 It is left largely to the persons unlawfully discriminated
against to bring suit to end employment discrimination. In light of
this scheme, class actions are particularly useful, for they offer a
means by which some of the burden of enforcement may be removed
from the individual. Through the class action device the courts may
"get behind" the claim of immediate and direct injury to an individual plaintiff," and fashion relief which will affect an entire class of
similarly situated persons. In a class action the court will permit an
individual plaintiff to act not only to enforce his own rights, but to
enforce those of others as a "private attorney general" in furtherance of the congressional policy against employment discrimination. 2
6. See note 5 supra; Sape & Hart, supra note 1, at 825-27. The former § 2000e-5(e)
provided, in part: "If... the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with this title . . . a civil action may be brought against the respondent . . . by the person
claiming to be aggrieved." The procedural discussions in this article apply only to suits
against private employers. Different rules govern suits against governmental bodies.
7. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103,
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970); see Sape & Hart, supra note 1, at 845-53; Ashton,
supra note 4, at 51-54.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H 1972); Ashton, supra note 4, at 64-68.
9. See note 8 supra; see H.R.Rw. 238, supra note 2, at 11-13; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 23-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 415].
10. Blumrosen, The Crossroadsfor EqualEmployment Opportunity:Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy?49 NoTRE DAME LAW. 46, 51-62 (1973); Spurlock, Proscribing
Retaliation Under Title VII, 8 IND. L. REv. 453, 455-58 (1975).
11. In the Title VII context, see e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th
Cir. 1968); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
12. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971); Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1969). Compare Sanchez v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970), with Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
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Title VII Class Actions

There are, of course, various requirements which must be met
before a suit under Title VII may proceed as a class action. Most
importantly, the standards set forth in rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure must be satisfied. 3 In its application of rule 23
to a possible class action, a court may define the class broadly or
narrowly, restrict the issues which can be litigated, and declare the
manner of relief available. Courts and commentators have
recognized competing interests in applying rule 23 either liberally
or restrictively to Title VII class actions.14 Since a judgment in a
class action is binding upon all class members, a broad definition
Inc. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See also S. REP. 415, supra note 9, at 27; Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Sections (a) and (b) of rule 23 set forth the requirements which
must be met:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
14. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., concurring); Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D.
62 (D.D.C. 1972); Sape & Hart, supra note 1, at 875-78; Comment, The Class Action and Title
VII-An Overview, 10 U. IacH. L. REv. 325 (1976); Comment, Class Actions and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class Representative and the Class Remedy, 47 TUL.
L. REV. 1005 (1973); see S. REP. 415, supra note 9, at 84-88.
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of the class and issues may work adversely upon unnamed class
members to whom the decision of the court may be res judicata. On
the other hand, liberal application of rule 23 is in keeping with the
congressional purpose of Title VII to end employment discrimination without placing an undue burden upon each private individual
to seek his own relief. This article will examine how various courts
have struck a balance between these competing interests in applying rule 23 to suits brought pursuant to Title VII. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the requirements of rule 23(a) and the notice
requirements under 23(b).
JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES

Outside the scope of rule 23, Title VII itself requires that before
an aggrieved employee may initiate suit, he must first file charges
of discrimination with the EEOC. 5 It is now well settled that, in the
class action context, only one class member must have filed such
charges as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the suit. 6 While participation in the class suit is not limited to employees who have actually
filed charges with the EEOC, some courts have excluded from the
class those employees who could not have filed such charges. 7 For
instance, where putative class members could not have filed timely
charges of discrimination because they were not employed by the
defendant at any time during the running of Title VII's statute of
limitations, they will be excluded from the class."
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. I 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970). The
filing of a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Johnson v. Seaboard
Airline R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
16. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 246 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1011 (1975); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). The filing of the charge with the
EEOC tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the class. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Those class members who have not filed charges with the Commission are sttll eligible for all forms of relief in the class action, including such personal damages
as reinstatement and back pay awards. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455
(5th Cir. 1970).
17. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975); Hecht v. Cooperative for Am. Relief Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Younger v.
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195, 198 (W.D. Va. 1969) ("[R]acial discrimination having timely been placed in issue, any facet of same is now properly before this court
for adjudication."); cf. Smith v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp.-Tulsa Div., 50 F.R.D. 515, 524 (N.D.
Okla. 1970) ("[Tlhose issues raised during the proceedings before the [EEOC] delineate
the scope of the issues which may properly be raised in the subsequent lawsuit. The issues
properly raised here, then, are the same as those stated in the original Charges of Discrimination filed with the Commission.") (emphasis added).
18. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011
(1975); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)(Supp. 11 1972).
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A corollary limitation imposed upon Title VII actions by this
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is that the issues which can be litigated in the civil suit must bear a logical
relationship to the issues contained in the Charge of Discrimination
filed with the EEOC. A Charge of Discrimination must be filed in
order to give the Commission an opportunity to fashion an administrative remedy to the alleged discrimination, thereby avoiding a
costly and lengthy court action. The statutory purpose of the conciliation would be subverted by permitting a subsequent suit to encompass issues unrelated to the original charge. Generally, the judicial answer to this problem has been to limit the scope of the civil
action to issues which could reasonably be expected to be within the
scope of the EEOC investigation. 9 The Fifth Circuit has stated that
the specific words of the Charge of Discrimination need not approach the literal exactitude of the judicial pleading. The proper
test is that
a judicial complaint filed pursuant to Title VII "may encompass
any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained
in the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission.". . . In other words, the
"scope" of the judicial complaint is limited to the "scope" of the
EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out
of the charge of discrimination.20
Most courts have viewed the factual allegations in the EEOC
charge broadly, in order to support the subsequent "related" allegations in the civil complaint. Where the same type of discrimination-sex, race, or national origin-is charged in both complaints,
the charges are generally held to be sufficiently similar." For instance, where the EEOC charge alleged only that the charging party
was discharged from her job on the basis of her sex, she was allowed
to challenge in the subsequent civil proceeding sexually discriminatory systems of seniority, promotion, and job classifications. 2 Simi19. This has been commonly denominated the "like or related to" test. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1970); Roberson v. Great American Ins. Co.
of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Hecht v. Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp.
891 (D. Me. 1970).
20. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting King v.
Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
21. See, e.g., Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974); Sciaraffa v. Oxford
Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970). The congressional policy favors conciliation and
informal adjudication of claims by the Commission. It is thought that to permit complainants
to raise new issues in the civil action deprives employers of the opportunity to settle the
grievances informally, through the Commissioner's conciliation procedures, and thereby to
avoid costly litigation.
22. Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me. 1970).
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larly, racially discriminatory hiring practices are properly challenged in the civil complaint where the EEOC charge alleged only
racially discriminatory conditions of employment. 3 These cases
view the underlying allegation of discrimination-whether racial,
sexual, or based upon national origin-as the thread that ties together the EEOC charge and the civil complaint, despite the differences in the factual allegations in the two charges.
More troublesome to the courts are situations where the EEOC
complaint alleged one form of discrimination, for instance sex discrimination, and the civil complaint seeks to litigate issues of a
different form of discrimination, such as racial discrimination. The
principal case in this area is Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. ,4 in
which the Fifth Circuit held that a Spanish surnamed woman who
alleged before the EEOC that she was discharged on the basis of sex
could, in the subsequent civil suit, raise issues of national origin
discrimination, despite her failure to allege such discrimination in
the proceedings before the Commission. The determinative factor
in the Sanchez decision was that the complainant could have been
subjected-to national original discrimination as well as sex discrimination, so that the EEOC in investigating her charge of sex discrimination would reasonably be expected to investigate the possibility
of national origin discrimination. Implicit in this decision is the
recognition that the ordinary complainant before the EEOC is often
of
unsophisticated and unskilled in the law, and may be unaware
25
him.
against
directed
is
which
the full range of discrimination
23. Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975).
24. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. The court stated in Sanchez, "the charging party may have precise knowledge of the
facts concerning the 'unfair thing' done to him, yet not be fully aware of the employer's
motivation for perpetrating the 'unfair thing.'" 431 F.2d at 462. The consideration that the
complainant is a layman, often an unskilled worker, is a recurring theme in cases interpreting
the scope of the EEOC complaint. Most often quoted is King v. Georgia Power Co:
It appears that a large number of the charges with EEOC are filed by ordinary
people unschooled in the technicalities of the law. As stated in the brief filed by
EEOC: "To compel the charging party to specifically articulate in a charge filed
with the Commission, the full panoply of discrimination which he may have suffered may cause the very persons Title VII was designed to protect to lose that
protection because they are ignorant of or unable to thoroughly describe the discriminatory practices to which they are subjected."
295 F. Supp. at 947.
A recent case contrary to Sanchez is Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Ins. Inc.. 522
F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975). Without citing Sanchez the court in Jenkins held that a black
woman whose EEOC Charge of Discrimination raised only racial discrimination could not in
her subsequent lawsuit challenge patterns and practices of sex discrimination. In support of
this position the court enunciated the following standard: "the correct rule to follow in
construing EEOC charges for purposes of delineating the proper scope of a subsequent judicial
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Later cases make it clear that the seemingly broad holding of
Sanchez is limited to cases where the complainant could have been
subject to the form of discrimination added in the civil complaint.
For instance, charges of sex discrimination filed with the EEOC by
a white female did not support a subsequent judicial challenge to
racial discrimination, since there was no potential for race discrimination against a white female.2 1 Likewise, charges of racial discrimination are not sufficiently related to allegations of national origin
discrimination.2 7 A black man who raises only racial discrimination
before the28EEOC cannot add allegations of sex discrimination in his
civil suit.
CLASS ACTION DETERMINATION

The mere allegation in a civil complaint pursuant to Title VII that
the suit is a class action does not entitle the suit to proceed as a class
action.29 Under rule 23(c)(1) the court must determine whether a
class action may be maintaned "[a]s soon as practicable after..
commencement." 30 A motion for class action certification may be
made by either party or by the court on its own motion.3
The courts are in agreement that the plaintiff bears the burden
inquiry is that 'the complaint in the civil action . . . may properly encompass any . . .
discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of
such allegations.'" 522 F.2d at 1241, quoting Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159,
162 (5th Cir. 1971).
26. EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Tenn.
1973).
27. Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (D.C. Pa. 1975).
28. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974). This case distinguished
Sanchez and stated the rule as follows:
Thus as the court noted in Sanchez, the remedial purposes of Title VII would hardly
be served by requiring possibly inarticulate and unsophisticated working people for
whom the statute was designed to protect to correctly state the precise type of
discrimination in their charge to the EEOC in order to later bring suit on a different
type of discrimination. This court agrees with Sanchez that the crucial element in
a charge is the factual allegations and not the legal conclusion initially attached to
the allegations. But as a caveat to this proposition, this court is of the opinion that
the discrimination uncovered must at least have had the potential of prejudicing
the charging party in order to be the subject of a later suit growing out of the charge.
(footnotes omitted).
376 F. Supp. at 761.
29. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975); Mason v. Calgon Corp.,
63 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). While it is not specified in the rule how long a delay between
filing suit and seeking class certification may be countenanced, it has been held that one year
is not unreasonable. Souza v. Scalone, 64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
31. See generally Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); 3B
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.50 at 23-1101 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE.]
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of showing that the prerequisites of rule 23 are met.2 Due to the
power of the court to redefine the class, create subclasses, or dismiss
the class counts altogether at any time during the pendency of the
suit, this initial burden is usually a "minimal" one.33 Weighing the
merits of the plaintiff's case is inappropriate at this time, as is any
determination as to whether the complaint states a cause of action.34
An evaluation of the merits at this early stage in the litigation would
result in trying the ultimate issue twice, at best a wasteful procedure. In sum, the cases appear to comply with Professor Moore's
suggestion that the requisite preliminary showing be a "minimal
demonstration that the complaint is sincere and the aggregate group
claim [is] substantial," or a "demonstration that the claim put
forth on behalf of the class is more than frivolous or speculative."3 5
To determine whether an action is properly maintainable as a
class action, the court is not bound by the pleadings, and may rely
upon matters not made part of the complaint. Information obtained by way of discovery is appropriately considered, and the
court can even go so far as to order an evidentiary hearing on the
3 7
issue of class action maintainability.
RULE 23(A) REQUIREMENTS

The availability of the class action device as a powerful enforcement mechanism for Title VII is no longer in question. While the
32. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); Poindexter v. Teubert,
462 F.2d 1096 (4th Cir. 1972); Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); Mason v. Calgon
Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
33. Mason v. Calgon Corp., 63 F.R.D. 98, 104 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
34. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); Scott v.
University of Delaware, 68 F.R.D. 606 (D. Del. 1975); Held v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.R.D.
346 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Hoston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975); Kohn v.
Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp.,
50 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
35. 4B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.45(3) at 23-804.
36. The scope of review of the district court's determination of the maintainability of a
purported class action has been described as follows:
In determining whether an action brought as a class action is to be so maintained
the trial court should carefully apply the criteria, set forth in Rule 23..., to the
facts of the case; and if it fails to do so its determination is subject to reversal by
the appellate court when the issue is properly before the latter court. On the other
hand, where the trial court does apply the Rule's criteria to the facts of the case,
the trial court has a broad discretion in determining whether the action may be
maintained as a class action and its determination should be given great respect
by a reviewing court.
3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.50 at 1104.05, quoted with approval in Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
37. Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Ala., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d
1362 (1st Cir. 1972); Held v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 64 F.R.D. 346 (S.D. Tex. 1974). See also Note,
Requests for Information in Class Actions, 83 YALE L.J. 602 (1974).
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Civil Rights Act itself is silent as to class actions, the courts have
laid to rest initial doubts that the enforcement provisions of the Act
envisioned such actions. Not only have class actions been held to
be permissible under Title VII,11 but it has been recognized that a
"suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action as the evil
sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic, i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin."4 Of course, the
strictures of rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must still be met.
Before certifying a class action, the court must, pursuant to
subsection (a) of the rule, determine that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impracticable (numerosity);
(2) common questions of law or fact exist as to the class (commonality); (3) the claims of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of the class (typicality); and, (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' Taken
as a whole, subsection (a) of the rule defines the outer limits of class
membership and the propriety of the named plaintiff's representative status. It is the thrust of the rule to insure that the class whose
rights are sought to be litigated in a single suit consists of persons
similarly situated, and that the person who is suing on behalf of the
class is the proper class representative.
In the past, most courts have given rule 23(a) a liberal interpretation in employment discrimination cases, consistent with the broad
remedial policies underlying Title VII. These courts have permitted
a single allegation of discriminatory conduct by an employer to
launch what has been termed an "across the board" attack upon
past, present and future policies and practices of the defendantemployer. For example, under the "across the board" approach, an
employee who had been unlawfully discharged was permitted to
represent a class consisting of present employees in a class action
38. At this point it must be noted that the 1972 Amendment to the Act was in no way
intended by Congress to supplant the class action remedy, or to change in any way class
action practice under Title VII. See 118 Cong. Rec. H1863 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1972).
39. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
40. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969); See also Senten v.
General Motors Corp. 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); Parmer v. National Cash Register Co.,
346 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The text of the rule is reprinted at note 10 supra.
42. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969) (generally
recognized as the "seed" case of the "across the board" analysis); see Barnette v. W.T. Grant
Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50
(5th Cir. 1974); League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp.
873 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972); Mack v.
General Electric Co. 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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to challenge not only discriminatory firing practices but also hiring
and promotional policies and the maintenance of segregated facilities.4 3 Courts adopting this "across the board" analysis of Title VII
class actions have recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that
whether the act or behavior complained of takes the form of enforcement of a company-wide discriminatory rule, or surfaces as a single
act directed at one individual, the underlying moving force is racial,
religious, or sexual prejudice, which Title VII intended to eliminate." Thus, these courts have been willing to "go behind" the
solitary discriminatory act to examine policies and practices of the
employer which are not direct contributing factors to the named
plaintiff's particular grievance. All Title VII class actions strike a
balance between preserving the integrity of rule 23 as a vehicle for
the resolution of the same or similar claims in a single proceeding,
and the effectuation of the goals of Title VII. These courts, it appears, give precedence to Title VII objectives over the preservation
of pure class action standards. Not all courts accept the "across the
board" approach, however, and apply the various requirements of
rule 23 strictly. 5
Numerosity
The numerosity requirement is designed to insure that the named
plaintiff's grievance is not personal to him, but that there are in fact
many other persons similarly situated. Where the class consists of
so few persons that joinder of their claims is not impracticable, class
action status will be denied. As with all rule 23(a) requirements, the
burden is upon the named plaintiff to show sufficient numerosity.4 '
The named plaintiff need not, to satisfy this burden, either identify
all the class members or state their exact number. 7 The court,
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. The court justified its broad definition of the class as follows:
The peculiar rights of specific individuals were not in controversy. . . . [The suit]
was directed at the system-wide policy of racial discrimination. It sought obliteration of that policy of system-wide racial discrimination. In various ways this was
sought through suitable declaratory orders and injunctions against any rule, regulation, custom or practice having any such consequence.
417 F.2d at 1124, quoting Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1963).
45. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Mason v. Calgon Corp., 68
F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Green v. Mo. Pacific R.R. Co., 62 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Smith v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp. Tulsa Div., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970); Blankenship v. Wometco Blue Circle, Inc., 59
F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 413 (D. Colo. 1971).
46. See O'Brien v. Shimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
47. See Marshall v. Electric Hose and Rubber Co., 68 F.R.D. 287 (D. Del. 1975); Williams
v. Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers Int. Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
43.
44.
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however, must be able to determine that the class is sufficiently
large so as to render the class action device the most efficient
manner to manage the suit.
The numerosity requirement poses no problem in cases utilizing
the "across the board" analysis, since the class in this type of suit
is so broadly defined. More often than not, the class in an "across
the board" case includes unascertained persons, such as future employees," or persons who have been deterred from applying for employment as a result of the defendant's discriminatory reputation.'
In such cases the numerosity requirement is readily met; joinder of
unascertained persons is obviously impracticable.
In cases where the putative class members can be identified,
plaintiff must show that joinder of all such members is impracticable. Various factors bear upon impracticability of joinder. The sheer
number of plaintiffs has been the overriding consideration and the
focus of most cases construing rule 23(a)(1) with most courts denying class treatment where the putative class falls below an apparent
cut-off point of twenty-five.- A sensible approach, however, is to
consider factors other than mere number-such as geographical location of the plaintiffs and their relationship to each other - to
determine impracticability of joinder. 5' This would permit class action litigation against a single employer by widely dispersed employees.
Commonality
Subsection (a)(2) of the rule requires that there be "questions of
law or fact common to the class." Again, in an "across the board"
attack upon wide-ranging policies and practices, the commonality
requirement is normally no bar to class certification. Diverse individual claims necessarily involve common questions despite their
factual dissimilarity since underlying each grievance is the question
of unlawful discrimination." Although class members have been
48. See, e.g., Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. See, e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518
F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
50. Scofield v. Board of Trustees of Lee City, 65 F.R.D. 595, 596-97 (N.D. Miss. 1975); 7
WRIGHT & MnIaE, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1762 (1972).
51. See Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1970); DeMarco v. Edens,
390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
52. See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), where an action
challenging promotional procedures was held to present common questions, against the defendant's claim that every promotional decision involves individual considerations as to each
employee:
[Aicceptance of this line of reasoning would mean that no cases alleging discrimination in hiring or promotions could be maintained as class actions. It is manifest
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subjected to factually distinct acts of discrimination, the alleged
motivation for these acts-unlawful discrimination-constitutes 5a3
common question of fact. As phrased in Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.
"whether the Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy
hangs over the racial class is a question of fact common to all the
members of the class." For example, in Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., a class consisting of past, present, and future
black employees alleging a policy of racial discrimination in hiring,
promotion, and conditions of employment was held to share common questions of law or fact.
While there may be some factual differences in the situations of
individual class members, it would unduly restrict the remedial
purposes of this civil rights legislation to fragment or dissolve a
class action because of such nuances, when racial discrimination
has been broadly alleged and all class members are potential victims of that discrimination.
While the commonality requirement is easily satisfied in "across
the board" cases, courts unwilling to adopt this approach have denied class certification on the grounds that the requisite commonality is lacking.5 5 These courts treat the various complaints of class
members as individual grievances, personal in nature, rather than
manifestations of unlawful discrimination. Because a resolution of
the individual claims will require an examination of the peculiar
circumstances of each class member, a class treatment is deemed
that every decision to hire, fire or discharge an employee may involve individual
considerations. Yet when that decision is made as part of class-wide discriminatory
practices, courts bear a special responsibility to vindicate the policies of the Act
regardless of the position of the individual plaintiff ....
Here the question common to the class is whether Appellee's procedures for
making promotions have resulted in discrimination against its minority employees.
532 F.2d at 524.
Other examples of the "across the board" approach to the commonality requirement are
found in Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971). ("Since a
permeating policy of racial discrimination is alleged, there can be little doubt that there are
"); Hecht v. Cooperative for
questions of law and fact common to all class members ....
American Relief Everywhere, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 305, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). ("Plaintiffs do
allege individual acts of discrimination of which they were the victims, but their argument
extends much further since they contend that these acts are part and parcel of a pattern of
discriminatory treatment of all women applicants and employees."); Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 370, 374 (D.S.C. 1974); Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.R.D. 62
(D.D.C. 1972).
53. 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
54. 68 F.R.D. 1, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
55. See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 62 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Padilla v. Stringer,
395 F. Supp. 495 (D. N.M. 1974); Smith v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp. - Tulsa Div., 50 F.R.D.
515 (N.D. Okla. 1970): White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
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inappropriate. For instance, in White v. Gates Rubber Co.,56 a discharged employee sought to challenge the defendant's alleged discriminatory practices not only as to firing, but also hiring, promotion, compensation, and terms of employment. The class count was
ordered stricken on the grounds that "it would be necessary to examine each instance of hiring, firing, promotion, and the like to
determine whether or not the action was justified before any conclusions could be reached as to a general practice of the defendant."57
A more recent example of the conservative approach to commonality is Padilla v. Stringer,58 a suit brought by a Mexican-American
allegedly denied promotion to the position of zookeeper because he
failed to meet the job requirement of possession of a high school
diploma. Plaintiff sought to represent all other Spanish-surnamed
individuals "who were, are, or will be discriminated against in their
employment" at the zoo." The court permitted the plaintiff to litigate, in the class claims, only the issue of the high school diploma
requirement for the job of zookeeper, holding that no commonality
existed as to any other possible claims of discrimination:
With the exception of plaintiff's challenge of the job requirement
of a high school diploma or equivalent for the zookeeper position,
it would be necessary to examine a myriad of facts and circumstances peculiar to each individual's claim in order to determine
whether each individual member of the class has been discriminated against in his employment. There has been no showing that
the defendants have dealt with the Spanish employees at the zoo
with a blanket set of procedures, policies, or practices that were not
applicable to all employees. The evidence mainly consisted of a
series of isolated incidents of widely varying fact patterns which
could be attributed to national origin discrimination or to other
causes. Thus, with regard to the claim of any individual Spanish
employee, a conclusion as to one employee in the class is not common or determinative when that issue arises with respect to another employee. 0
The narrow view represented by White v. Gates Rubber Co. and
Padillav. Stringer would appear to be inappropriate in employment
discrimination litigation. It ignores the underlying precept that discrimination on the basis of a protected identifiable characteristic,
such as race or sex, is by definition class discrimination. The grava56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
Id.at 413.
395 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.M. 1974).
Id.at 502.

Id.
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men of racial discrimination is that it ignores individual characteristics and focuses only upon race. Thus, if an individual plaintiff
alleges discrimination on the basis of race, the employer's conduct
toward all other employees of that race is necessarily called into
question despite the differences in the purported class members'
personal situations.
A further weakness of these cases is a misapprehension of the
nature of the burden of proof necessary to sustain certification of the
class. To deny a lawsuit class treatment because the claims of the
purported class members are "isolated incidents of widely varying
fact patterns" directed against them as individuals is to pass upon
the ultimate issue of the suit. That is, it is the purpose of the litigation to determine whether the employer's conduct is, in fact, directed toward the employees as individuals or whether it is motivated by unlawful discrimination. At the outset of the litigation,
when only the question of certification of the class is at issue, the
court should not examine the merits of individual claims; rather it
should determine whether the suit claims that the employer has
acted on the basis of a protected class characteristic.
Typicality
The requirement that the claims of the representative parties be
"typical of the claims of the class" has not generated as much litigation as other sections of the rule. However, the cases that have discussed typicality more than cursorily are not in agreement as to its
meaning." Some cases have treated it as synonomous with either
commonality"2 or representativity63 and have declined to give it a
meaning of its own. There is, indeed, a good deal of overlap among
the subsections of rule 23. But, as other courts have recognized, the
drafters of the rule must have intended independent meanings for
the subsections or they would not have been separated. 4
The definition of typicality most often adopted appears to be
based upon a common-sense reading of the rule:
61. See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263. 269 (10th Cir. 1975) and cases cited
therein; Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968); Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 370 (D.S.C. 1974); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970).
62. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally 4B MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 23.06-2 at 23-325.
63. Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970); Williams v. Local No. 19. Sheet
Metal Workers Int. Ass'n., 59 F.R.D. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
64. Professor Moore would disagree. He states, regarding the typicality requirement: "In
fact, there is no need for this clause, since all meanings attributable to it duplicate requirements prescribed by other provisions of Rule 23." 4B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.06-2 at
23-325.
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[A] reasonable reading of the requirement would seem to entail
the necessity of demonstrating that there are other members of the
class who have the same or similar grievances of the plaintiff. It
seems apparent that a claim cannot be typical as the claims of the
class if no other member of the class feels aggrieved. . . . In other
words, the fact that hypothetical claims would be similar is considered sufficient for finding the plaintiff's claim to be typical."
Most Title VII plaintiffs will have little difficulty sustaining this
minimal burden, particularly if the "across the board" approach is
taken. It would appear that if the more stringent requirement of
commonality is deemed met, "similarity" of grievances would be
perforce established.
Representativity
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the court determine that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class." This subsection of the rule reflects the concern of the
drafters that unnamed class members will be bound by an unfavorable judgment in a suit prosecuted by parties whose interests may be
adverse to theirs. Thus, even courts which treat the other subsections summarily, or define commonality and typicality broadly, will
approach the representativity requirement with caution.
There are three criteria for adequacy of representativity. First, the
plaintiff's attorney must be qualified, experienced and vigorous in
his prosecution of the lawsuit." Secondly, there must be no probability that the suit is collusive. 7 Finally, the named plaintiff must
have no conflict of interest with remaining class members."8 This
final requirement is often phrased as a standing problem: whether
the named plaintiff can adequately represent the remaining class
members. 9 Of the three components to representativity, the question of standing has prompted the most litigation.
Most courts, consistent with the liberal definitions of commonality and typicality, have taken a broad view of standing in Title VII
65. Sullivan v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 370, 374 (D.S.C. 1974), quoting
White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Col. 1971). See also Taylor v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 269 (10th Cir. 1975).
66. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975).
67. Williams v. Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers Int. Ass'n., 59 F.R.D. 49, 55 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
68. Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 1975).
69. Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973); Tipler v. E.I. duPont
deNemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971); League of United Latin American Citizens
v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 887 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 62
F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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litigation. The concept of standing traditionally entails "injury in
fact."70 However, in the field of class action employment litigation,
it is generally recognized that the named plaintiff has standing to
represent the class even if his individual action is dismissed on the
merits.7 ' That is, despite the conclusion that the representative
party has himself suffered no injury, he may proceed to represent
the class. Thus, it should be no bar to class action certification that
the named plaintiff has not proven himself to be the victim of discrimination.
In this context an individual may represent class persons in occupations other than his own," people of races other than his own,73
and may, in his status as the representative of the class, challenge
practices which could not, on the facts of the case, be applied to
him.74 For example, in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co.," a named plaintiff alleged that the company's refusal to hire
him was based upon racial discrimination. He was also permitted
to challenge: (1) the company's job requirement of a high school
diploma even though he had graduated from high school; and (2)
the company's recruitment program even though that program had
not deterred him from applying.
A recurring problem in the determination of representativity is
whether a former employee can adequately represent any future
employees of the company. Although this class representative may
be adequately aware of past employment practices, his possible lack
of familiarity with existing practice has caused some courts to fear
that he will seek recourse for only his personal grievances and not
for the class as a whole.76 The weight of authority, however, grants
70. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 15154 (1970). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (Court's jurisdiction
may be invoked only where the complaint alleges that plaintiff himself has suffered "some
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action .... ").
71. Moss v. Lane, 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970); Hadnott v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304, 311
n.21 (D.D.C. 1972); Brown v. Gaston City Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972).
See Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975), and cases cited therein.
72. Crockett v. Green, 388 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1975), aff'd 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
'1976) (plaintiff who applied for job as bricklayer and mason permitted to litigate alleged
discrimination aganst mechanics, electricians, heavy equipment operators and others.
73. National Organization of Women v. Bank of California, 5 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7440 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (black plaintiff permitted to represent class of blacks and Spanish-surnamed
persons allegedly discriminated against on the grounds of race and ethnic background).
74. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); League of
United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(named plaintiff who was refused employment as firefighter permitted to challenge not only
firefighter's written test, but policemen's written test).
75. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
76. Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (D. Del. 1973); Hyatt v.
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a former employee standing to represent present and future employees." In fact, it has even been suggested that former employees are
in a better position than present employees to present a vigorous
and aggressive case against the company since they are free from
any possible coercive influence exerted by the company.78 Furthermore, if former employees were denied representative status, it has
been said "employers would be encouraged to discharge those employees suspected as most likely to initiate a Title VII suit in the
expectation that such employees would be rendered incapable of
bringing the suit as a class action."7 9 A former employee's unfamiliarity with current employment practices, finally, can be cured by
means of discovery.
RULE 23(B), NOTICE AND CLASS-WIDE RELIEF

Once it has been established that the purported class action
meets the four requirements of rule 23(a), the court must determine
whether it satisfies the strictures of section (b) of the rule. That is,
the suit may proceed as a class action only if it fits the definition of
subsection (b)(2) or (b)(3).10 Subsection (b)(2) permits a class action
when "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole." Under (b)(3), a class suit is permitted if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy."
United Aircraft Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 50 F.R.D. 242, 244 (D. Conn. 1970); Burney v.
N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
77. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975); Jack v. American
Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476 F.2d
721 (8th Cir. 1973); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
See also Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff claiming racially motivated
discharge allowed to represent all black persons who would have applied for employment but
for the discriminatory hiring and recruitment practices of defendant); Scott v. University of
Delaware, 68 F.R.D. 606 (D. Del. 1975) (university professor whose contract was not renewed
is proper representative of class of blacks who have been discriminated against in recruitment
and hiring). But see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975) (present
employees cannot fairly and adequately represent those who were rejected or deterred from
employment because of discriminatory practices).
78. Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
79. Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975).
80. The text of rule 23(b) is set out in note 10 supra. While there is a further subsection
to section (b), (b)(1), it does not apply in employment discrimination litigation. The controversy apt to arise under section (b) is not whether the suit satisfies the requirements of the
section, but whether a class suit should be certified as a (b)(2) or a (b)(3) class action.
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Subsection (b)(2) class actions represent a more cohesive group
of individuals, whose circumstances and interests are more nearly
identical than in a (b)(3) suit. While the (b)(3) action is not the true
successor to the "spurious" class action existing prior to the 1966
amendments to rule 23, it developed therefrom."' Since the (b)(3)
class is more heterogeneous than the (b) (2) class, the drafters of the
rule considered it inequitable that non-party class members in a
(b)(3) suit should be bound by the final judgment, absent notice of
the pendency of the litigation and the opportunity to exclude themselves from it. Thus, section (c)(2) of the rule was designed to provide that in (b)(3) class actions the unnamed class members receive
"the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." 2 In this manner non-parties are given the opportunity to avoid the res judicata effect of an unfavorable judgment by
"opting out" of the class.
The onerous notice requirement in (b)(3) suits has assumed even
greater proportions since the landmark decision of Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin,8 3 in which the Court held that not only must the
named plaintiff in (b)(3) suits provide individual notice to reasonably identifiable class members, but that the plaintiff must bear
the full cost of such notice. In a sizeable lawsuit, as against a large
company with many affected employees, the cost of providing notice
could virtually bar the maintenance of (b)(3) actions.
While there is no dispute that notice is mandatory in (b)(3) class
actions, in (b)(2) suits the rule only "permits" the court to order
that notice of the litigation be given to non-parties. 8 Accordingly,
See generally Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 248-50 (3d Cir. 1975).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(2) provides in full:
In any action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the
class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
83. 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see Comment, Federal Class Action Rule Held to Require Notice
by Plaintiff at His Own Expense to Members of the Class - Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,5
Lov. Cm.L.J. 264 (1974).
84. FED. R. Cir. P. 23(d) provides in pertinent part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate
orders . . .requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
81.
82.
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many courts have held that in (b)(2) suits notice is not mandatory,
but may be ordered as a matter of the court's discretion. 5 There is
a growing body of authority, however, including recent decisions of
the Second, 8 Sixth, and Seventh 8 Circuits, that outside the aegis
of rule 23, some form of notice is a requirement of due process in all
forms of representative actions, if the resulting judgment is to be
binding on absent class members." It is not at all clear that these
jurisdictions would demand individual notice in (b)(2) actions, as
(b)(3) suits require. Nonetheless, notice sufficient to comport with
due process would appear to be that which is "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 0 Notice by publication may satisfy this standard.9 ' Thus, even in jurisdictions which require notification of unnamed class members in order to accord finality to the judgment,
the notice requirement is not as taxing in (b)(2) actions as it is in
(b)(3) suits.
Fortunately for class action plaintiffs, it is generally recognized
that employment discrimination suits are more appropriately certified under (b)(2) rather than under (b)(3).12 This is because the
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action ....
85. See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Mungin v.
Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1971); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. La. 1970).
86. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir, 1968). The conclusion of the
Second Circuit that notice is a due process requirement is not undercut by the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in the same case. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974).
87. Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
88. Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 76 of Wis., 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972).
89. See also Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970); Hoston v. United States
Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975); Branham v. General Electric Co., 63 F.R.D. 667
(M.D. Tenn. 1974).
90. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
91. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-20 (1950) and
cases cited therein. Notice by publication would be particularly appropriate in cases where
potential class members were unascertainable. Mullane states:
This court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a customary
substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable
to give more adequate warning. Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of
persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile
means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional
bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.
Id. at 317. See also Branham v. General Electric Co., 63 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), where
notice by publication to members in a (b)(2) class is ordered.
92. Class actions which meet the more rigorous requirements of (b)(2) certification will
almost always qualify under (b)(3) as well. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d
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conduct of the employer-defendant is actionable "on grounds generally applicable to the class," i.e., on the grounds of unlawful discrimination. The relief sought is normally "relief with respect to the
class as a whole": injunctive and declaratory orders. As stated in
Senter v. General Motors Corp., "[1lawsuits alleging class-wide
discrimination are particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment
since the common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject
to a single injunctive remedy."93 In fact, the Advisory Committee
Notes for rule 23 support the judicial preference for (b)(2) certification in Title VII suits; they offer as an illustration of a 23(b)(2) class
action a civil rights case "where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration."94
In addition to obtaining injunctive relief in (b)(2) class actions,
it is now generally recognized that individual damages, in the form
of reinstatement and back pay, may be awarded in (b)(2) actions. 5
The Advisory Committee warns that subsection (b)(2) "does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominately to money damages,"" but no case has
held that a request for class relief in the form of back pay automatically renders (b)(2) treatment inapplicable. The courts have, as a
rule, characterized Title VII class actions as "essentially equitable
in nature,"97 even when money damages are sought, and award back
pay as an ancillary "make-whole" remedy to injunctive or declarative relief.9 Typical of the reasoning employed is that of the Fourth
Circuit:
This is a case in which final injunctive relief is appropriate and
the defendants' liability for back pay is rooted in grounds applica239, 252 (3d Cir. 1975) (Virtually every class action meeting the requirements of 23(b)(2) will
also meet the less severe requirements of 23(b)(3)). In these situations, which are common,
the judicial preference is for (b)(2) certification. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d
511 (6th Cir. 1976); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v.
Local No. 19, Sheet Metal Workers Int. Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
93. 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976).
94. Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. Civ. P. 23, at 298.
95. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 251 (3d
Cir. 1975); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United
Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522
F.2d 333, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1975); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir.
1969).
96. Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. Cwv. P. 23 at 298 (emphasis added).
97. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 406, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424
U.S. 747 (1976) ("back pay awards under Title VII ... [are] an integral part of the equitable remedy.")
98. See cases cited in note 92 supra.
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ble to all members of the defined class. Under these circumstances
the award of back pay, as one element of the equitable remedy,
conflicts in no way with the limitations of Rule 23(b)(2).1
The practice of granting back pay awards in (b)(2) class actions
is not without its problems and critics.' 0 Since notification to nonparty plaintiffs of the pendency of the law suit is not universally
required, class members eligible for back pay awards may be prevented from claiming them simply because they did not know of the
litigation.'' Concern for procedural fairness to the employerdefendant has also been expressed:
The defendant should be given the opportunity to assess prospective back pay claims early in the proceeding so as to weigh the pros
and cons of settlement. In addition, a defendant should not be
subjected to relitigation of individual back pay claims, a possibility which would tend to result from Rule 23(b)(2) classification and
notice to individual class members of the
its consequent lack of
02
existence of the suit.'
Flexibility in the management of class actions provided by rule
23, however, offers solutions to these problems. Rule 23(c)(4)' 3 authorizes the court to create subclasses and redefine the classes at
any time during the pendency of the litigation. Thus, the employees
to whom fairness demands individual notification of the suit can be
designated as a (b) (3) class, with the remainder of the suit proceeding as a (b)(2) action.' 4 Or, as some courts have done,' 5 the litigation may be treated as a (b)(2) suit for the purposes of determining
whether the employer has engaged in class-wide discrimination requiring injunctive relief. Once this liability has been established,
the suit can then be designated as a (b)(3) suit for the purpose of
litigating liability for individual back pay claims. Bifurcation of the
class in this manner is consonant with both procedural fairness to
the parties and broad remedial purposes of Title VII.
99. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971).
100. Comment, The Class Action and Title VII-An Overview, 10 U. R~cH. L.R. 325
(1976).
101. See Hoston v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650 (E.D. La. 1975).
102. Comment, The Class Action and Title VII-An Overview, supra note 97, at 337.
103. Rule 23 (c)(4) provides as follows:
When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class . . ..
104. Branham v. General Electric Co., 63 F.R.D. 667, 670-72 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
105. Williams v. Local No. 19 Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 49, 55-56 (E.D.
Pa. 1973); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 342 (10th Cir. 1975).
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CONCLUSION

The vision of Congress in enacting Title VII was to remove artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when these
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate against employees on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications. While the
Act makes a public promise to minorities that they shall receive
equal employment opportunities, private parties, the victims of discrimination, are relied upon to put flesh on that promise. In this
regard, the class action device must be viewed as the cutting edge
of the enforcement provisions of Title VII. In this way the rights of
many similarly aggrieved employees can be litigated together, taking some of the burden from the private sector while fostering judicial economy and efficiency. Most courts have recognized the special advantages of class actions in Title VII cases, and have not
permitted overly technical interpretations of rule 23 to obstruct the
congressional policy in favor of widespread elimination of employment discrimination.

